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CURRENT LEGISLATION
FEDERAL INTERPLEADER APPLIED TO INHERITANCE TAX Dis-
PUTES.-For many years persons, having in their possession money
or property in which they had no personal interest, were often sub-
jected to double vexation by the claims of citizens of different states.
The only remedy they might have had, interpleader, was not avail-
able, because the courts, both state 1 and federal, 2 were unable to ob-
tain the necessary personal jurisdiction of the claimants. In 1917,
Congress passed the first Federal Interpleader Act 3 which removed
this difficulty by allowing the district courts to issue process running
into all parts of the country. The Act, however, conferred only a
limited jurisdiction as to parties and it did not remove the ban im-
posed by Section 265 of the Judicial Code 4 on injunctions against
suits in the state courts. The remedy sought to be achieved had, there-
fore, a very limited application.
Subsequent amendments 5 increased the classes of stakeholders
who might interplead, and removed the bar presented by Section 265.
The ease and rapidity with which this statutory remedy worked and
the benefits which inured to both stakeholders and claimants led to
the realization that it might justly be extended to all classes of stake-
holders.6 Accordingly in 1936 Congress passed a new act which
provided relief for "any person, firm, corporation, association or so-
ciety" which was subject to double vexation by citizens of different
states.
7
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518, 36 Sup. Ct. 613 (1916) ; Hama v. Stedman,
230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. 566 (1921).
236 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 111-114 (1926).
'Act of Feb. 22, 1917 (39 STAT. 929), U. S. ComnP. STAT. § 991(a) (1919
Supp.).
'28 U. S. C. A. § 379 (1926). This section is derived from Act of March
2, 1793, c. 22, § 5, 1 STAT. 334, and REv. STAT. § 720. It provided that:
"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United
States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where
such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in
bankruptcy."
See Chafee, Interpleader in U. S. Courts (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 41, n. 2. See
also Lowther v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 278 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
'43 STAT. 976 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (26) (1925); 44 STAT. 416
(1926), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (1926).
6Chafee, Interpleader in U. S. Courts (1932) 42 YALz L. 3. 41.
"28 U. S. C. A. § 41, subd. (26). The bill was entitled "An Act to Amend
Sec. 24 of the Judicial Code by Conferring on District Courts Additional Juris-
diction of Bills of Interpleader and of Bills in the Nature of Interpleader."
The section now reads:
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A problem which seemed for a long time to be practically un-
solvable seems to have been solved, at least in part, by this latest
"See. 41. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as fol-
lows: * * *.
"(26) Original jurisdiction of bills of interpleader, and bills in the
nature of interpleader. (a) Of suits in equity begun by bills of interpleader
or bills in the nature of bills of interpleader duly verified, filed by any person,
firm, corporation, association, or society having in his or its custody or posses-
sion money or property of the value of $500 or more, or having issued a note,
bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of the value or amount
of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery or payment or the loan of money
or property of such amount or value, or being under any obligation written or
unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, if-
"(i) Two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states, are claim-
ing to be entitled to such money or property, or to any one or more of the
benefits arising by virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy, or other instru-
ment, or arising by virtue of any such obligation; and
"(ii) The complainant (a) has deposited such money or property or has
paid the amount of or the loan or other value of such instrument or the amount
due under such obligation into the registry of the court, there to abide thejudgment of the court; or (b) has given bond payable to the clerk of the court
in such amount and with such surety as the court or judge may deem proper,
conditioned upon the compliance by the complainant with the future order or
decree of the court with respect to the subject matter of the controversy.
"Such a suit in equity may be entertained although the titles or claims of
the conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but
are adverse to and independent of one another.
"(b) Such a suit may be brought in the district court of the district in
which one or more of such claimants resides or reside.
"(cy Notwithstanding any provision of Part I of this title to the contrary,
said court shall have power to issue its process for all such 'claimants and to
issue an order of injunction against each of them, enjoining them from insti-
tuting or prosecuting any suit or proceeding in any State court or in any United
States court on account of such money or property or on such instrument or
obligation until the further order of the court; which process and order of
injunction shall be returnable at such time as the said court or a judge thereof
shall determine and shall be addressed to and served by the United States
marshals for the respective districts wherein said claimants reside or may be
found.
"(d) Said court shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge the
complainant from further liability; and shall make the injunction permanent and
enter all such other orders and decrees as may be necessary or convenient to
carry out and enforce the same.
"(e) In any action at law in a United States District Court against any
person, firm, corporation, association, or society, such defendant may set up
by way of equitable defense, in accordance with section 398 of this title, any
matter which would entitle such person, firm, corporation, association, or society
to file an original or ancillary bill of interpleader or bill in the nature of inter-
pleader in the same court or in any other United States District Court a~ainst
the plaintiff in such action at law and one or more other adverse claimants,
under the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection or any other provision
of Part I of this title and the rules of court made pursuant thereto. The defen-
dant may join as parties to such equitable defense any claimant or claimants
who are not already parties to such action at law. The district court in which
such equitable defense is interposed shall thereby possess the powers conferred
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enactment.8 The estates of wealthy individuals are often subjected
to double inheritance and transfer taxes when they include property
in more than one state. Each state claims that the decedent was
domiciled there, and the courts of the respective states decide the in-
dividual claims. The executor is bound, therefore, to fight both suits,
yet each state may decide eventually that the decedent was domiciled
within its boundaries. The decision in one state is not res judicata
in the action in the other state, so that double taxation may result.
A famous example of this situation is that of the Dorrance estate9
which has already been depleted to the extent of several million dol-
lars by a Pennsylvania inheritance tax and the treasury of New
Jersey will probably be enriched in a similar manner. Each state
claims that the decedent was' domiciled there at the time of his death.
The two claims are, of course, mutually inconsistent, but in spite of
that the executors seem powerless to prevent both states from col-
lecting the tax. Furthermore, the New Jersey courts have refused
to allow the amount paid on the Pennsylvania tax to be deducted
from the total taxable estate.
In another recent case, Matter of Trowbridge,10 Connecticut sub-
mitted the question of the decedent's domicile to the New York courts.
After an adverse decision by the Surrogate, the Court of Appeals re-
versed and decided in favor of Connecticut. This method of settling
the question is not likely to be resorted to very often, as there is a
perfectly natural hesitation on the part of each state to risk the prob-
able prejudice of other courts in favor of their own respective states.
Federal interpleader, on the other hand, offers an easy and prac-
ticable solution of this problem." It has been held for some time,
that for purposes of inheritance taxation, intangibles 'have only
upon district courts by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this subsection and by
section 398 of this title.
"Sec. 2. The Act entitled, 'An act authorizing casualty companies, surety
companies, insurance companies or associations or fraternal or beneficial soci-
eties to file bills of interpleader," approved May 8, 1926 (U. S. C., Supp. III,
title 28, sec. 41 (26)) is hereby repealed. Said repeal shall not affect any act
done or any right accruing or accrued in any suit or proceeding had or com-
menced under said Act hereby repealed, prior to the passage of this Act, but
all such acts or rights, suits or proceedings shall continue and be valid and may
be prosecuted and enforced in the same manner as if said Act had not been
repealed hereby." (Jan. 20, 1936, c. 13, 49 STAT. 1096.)
1 Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 YAIs L. 3. 1161,
1169 et seq.
"In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 At. 303 (1932), cert. denied, 287
U. S. 660 (1932), 288 U. S. 617 (1933) ; Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 53 Sup. Ct.
122 (1932) ; In re Dorrance's Estate, 172 Atl. 900 (1933) ; In re Dorrance, 115
N. J. Eq. 268, 170 At. 601, 116 N. J. Eq. 204, 172 Atl. 503 (1934), affd, 13
N. J. Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (1935); Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393 (1935),
aff'g, 12 F. Supp. 746 (D. N. J. 1935).
10266 N. Y. 283, 194 N. E. 756 (1935).
"Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 YAIr L. 3.
1161, 1169 et seq.
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one situs, which is the domicile of the decedent at the time of his
death.' 2 Furthermore, a person can have only one domicile, no mat-
ter how many residences he may have.13 The federal courts, having
power under the Act to issue process running into all parts of the
country, can obtain jurisdiction of the tax officials of both states and
can enjoin each of them from any further proceeding. This will give
to a single court the opportunity to decide the question of domicile
in one proceeding with all the parties before it. Since the two states
may have different laws as to domicile this may give rise to a federal
rule.1 4
It will not be necessary for the district court to decide the amount
of the tax due; having decided in which state the decedent was domi-
ciled, the amount of the tax may quite properly be left to the state
officials.'5 The executor may file a bond, in accordance with the
terms of the Act, to insure payment of the proper amount after the
main question is decided.
The objection will be made that the stakeholder may be a co-
citizen of one of the claimants and therefore the court should not have
jurisdiction. This objection, however, has been held not to be a bar
to jurisdiction in several cases under the Acts,16 but in any event
this may be avoided by appointing an executor from some third state.1
A further objection may be that such a suit is, in reality, one
against the respective states and is, therefore, prohibited by the Elev-
enth Amendment.'8 However, one of the taxes is in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment 19 and therefore one of the state officials is
' First National Bank of Boston, Ex'r, v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup.
Ct. 174 (1932); Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., Ex'r, v. Minnesota, 280 U. S.
204, 50 S12p. Ct. 98 (1930) ; City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., Ex'r, v. Schnader,
291 U. S. 24, 54 Sup. Ct. 259 (1934); Worcester County Trust Co., Ex'r, v.
Long, 14 F. Supp. 754 (D. Mass. 1936).
Brisenden v. Chamberlain, 53 Fed. 307 (D. S. C. 1892) ; Corel v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 123 Fed. 452 (D. Mo. 1903) ; U. S. ex rel. Thomas v. Day,
29 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); In re Newcomb, 192 N. Y. 238, 84 N. E.
950 (1908); Commonwealth v. Gogigian, 265 Mass. 531, 164 N. E. 472 (1929).
14 Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1171, n. 27.
"Worcester County Trust Co., Ex'r, v. Long, 14 F. Supp. 754 (D. Mass.
1936).
11Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Allen v.
Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
'a Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1161,
n. 33; Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U. S. 183, 52 Sup. Ct. 84(1931).
'U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XI.
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."
"U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV.
"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
1937 ]
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acting unconstitutionally,20 although which one is as yet uncertain.
In many suits against state officials, the jurisdiction of the court has
been upheld.21  In the case of Gunter v. Atlantic C. L. R. R. Co.,
Mr. Justice White said: 22
"A suit against state officers to enjoin them from enforcing
a tax alleged to be invalid is not a suit against a state, within
the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment."
This view is further supported by the words of Chief Justice Hughes
in the more recent case of Sterling v. Constantin: 23
"The applicable principle is that, where state officials, pur-
porting to act under state authority, invade rights secured by
the Federal Constitution, they-are subject to the process of
the federal courts in order that the persons injured may have
appropriate relief."
Thus there seems no sound or valid objection to federal inter-
pleader in such tax disputes and it seems probable that the courts
will take jurisdiction whenever such cases arise, following the ex-
ample of the Massachusetts District Court in Worcester County Trust
Co. v. Long.24
EDWARD J. CARRY.
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State d~prive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
' First National Bank of Boston, Ex'r, v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup.
Ct. 174 (1932).
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898) ; Prout v. Starr,
188 U. S. 537, 23 Sup. Ct. (1903); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.,
200 U. S. 273, 26 Sup. Ct. 252 (1906) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup.
Ct. 441 (1908) ; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932);
State of Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 54 Sup. Ct. 18 (1933).
-200 U. S. 273, 283, 26 Sup. Ct. 252 (1906).
-287 U. S. 378, 393, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932).
14 F. Supp. 754 (D. Mass. 1936).
[ VOL. 11
